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FARM LEASES AND PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES
— by Neil E. Harl*
Enactment of the passive activity loss rules in 19861 was
motivated by a desire to curb tax shelter abuses and to correct the
misallocation of resources caused by tax-induced investment in
agriculture and elsewhere in the economy.  Thus, it is not
surprising that the provisions have caused economic pain.  One
provision, involving the deduction of up to $25,000 for losses
attributable to "rental real estate activities," has led to taxpayer
confusion and uncertainty for their tax advisors.2
Tests for deductibility.  In general, losses from
passive trade or business activities, to the extent deductions exceed
income from all passive activities (exclusive of portfolio income),
may not be deducted against other income unless the taxpayer is
"materially participating."3  A taxpayer is considered to be
materially participating in an activity only if the person "is
involved in the operations of the activity on a basis which is
regular, continuous, and substantial."4
Temporary regulations published in 1988 lay out seven tests
for material participation.5  All of the tests focus to a degree on
the time devoted to the operation by the taxpayer.  Here are the
seven tests—
• Under the first test, an individual is considered to be materi-
ally participating if the individual participates in the activity for
more than 500 hours during the year.6
• The second test is for situations requiring less than 500
hours of involvement, or less than 500 hours by any one individ-
ual, during the year.7  If the individual's participation in the activ-
ity constitutes "substantially all of the participation" in the activ-
ity by all individuals during the year, it is considered material
participation.8
• Under the third test, an individual is considered to be materi-
ally participating if the individual puts more than 100 hours per
year into the activity and the individual's participation is not less
than that of any other individual.9  This rule would not apply if a
tenant was involved who put 500 hours per year into the activity
and the owner put 300 hours per year into the venture, for
example.
• Under the fourth test, an individual is treated as materially
participating in "significant participation activities" if the
individual's aggregate participation in significant participation
activities for the year exceeds 500 hours.10  A "significant partici
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pation activity" or SPA is a  trade or  business  activity  in which
the individual participates for more than 100 hours for the taxable
year.11  This rule is intended to reach those individuals who
devote more than 500 hours per year spread over several activities.
The idea is to treat that individual as favorably as someone who
devotes an equivalent amount of time to a single activity.
• With the fifth test, an individual is treated as materially par-
ticipating if the individual materially participated in the activity
for any five of the ten taxable years immediately preceding the
taxable year.12  The regulations point out that material participa-
tion for years before 1987 requires more than 500 hours'
involvement during the year.13
• The sixth test is for those involved in personal service activ-
ities (involving the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture,
accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, consulting or any
other trade or business in which capital is not a material income
producing factor.14  Under that rule, an individual is treated as
materially participating in a personal service activity if the
taxpayer materially participated in the activity for any three
taxable years preceding the taxable year in question.15
• The seventh and final test specifies that an individual may be
treated as  materially participating in an activity based on all the
facts and circumstances.16  The regulations do not specify what
facts and circumstances are to be considered, but the regulations do
point out several factors to keep in mind—
(1)  The fact that an individual is materially participating for
purposes of self-employment tax or special use valuation for
federal estate tax purposes is not taken into account for purposes
of the passive loss rules.17  This seems inconsistent with a
passage in the Senate Finance Committee report that stated,
"in the case of farming, the committee anticipates that an
individual who does not perform physical work relating to a farm,
but who is treated as having self-employment income with
respect to the farm under section 1402, generally will be treated
as materially participating."18
(2)  An individual who does not participate in an activity for
more than 100 hours per year cannot meet the facts and circum-
stances test.19
(3)  An individual's participation in management of an activity
is not taken into account in applying the facts and circumstances
test if a paid manager participates in the activity.20  The outcome
is the same if the management services performed by the individ-
ual are exceeded by those performed by any other individual.21
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This rule is clearly the most difficult to meet of the three rules
governing the imputation of activities from agent to principal—
(a) under the general rule, activities of an agent are imputed to the
principal except where provided otherwise by statute or regula-
tion;22 (b) where the question of material participation is routed
through I.R.C. § 1402, a 1974 amendment bars imputation of the
activities of an agent to the principal;23 and (c) for purposes of
the passive loss rules, the mere presence of a paid manager or
agent bars even the principal's involvement in management from
counting toward the material participation requirement.24  The
latter rule is indeed harsh, particularly considering that even where
imputation of an agent's activity to the principal is blocked, it has
been possible to achieve material participation despite the
presence of a paid manager or agent, such as a farm manager.25
Several additional rules impact on the question of material
participation.
• In determining whether a taxpayer materially participates, the
participation of the taxpayer's spouse is taken into account,
whether or not they file a joint income tax return.26
• Farm taxpayers are permitted to qualify as materially partici-
pating if they participate materially for five or more years in the
eight year period before retirement or disability.27
• The material participation test is met by surviving spouses
who inherit qualified real property from a deceased spouse if the
surviving spouse engages in "active management."28
• A C corporation is treated as materially participating in an
activity with respect to which one or more shareholders, owning a
total of more than 50 percent of the outstanding corporate stock,
materially participate.29
• An estate or trust, except for grantor trusts, is apparently
treated as materially participating if a fiduciary meets the material
participation test.30
Active participation test.  A taxpayer may deduct annu-
ally up to $25,000 of passive activity losses and the deduction
equivalent of passive activity credits attributable to rental real
estate activities in which the taxpayer actively participates.31  The
active participation requirement applies both in the year of loss
and in the year of allowance of the loss.32  The $25,000
allowance phases out ratably as the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income (determined without regard to passive activity losses)
increases from $100,000 to $150,000.33  The $25,000 allowance
is not available to corporations.34
The crucial question for farm investors with the active partici-
pation test is whether rental farmland is a "rental real estate activ-
ity."  Under the temporary regulations, a 50-50 crop share lease is
treated as a joint venture and not as a rental real estate activity.35
The regulations state—
"The taxpayer makes farmland available to a tenant farmer
pursuant to an arrangement designated a 'crop share' lease.  Under
the arrangement, the tenant is required to use the tenant's best
efforts to farm the land and produce marketable crops.  The
taxpayer is obligated to pay 50 percent of the costs incurred in
the activity (without regard to whether any crops are successfully
produced or marketed), and is entitled to 50 percent of the crops
produced (or 50 percent of the proceeds from marketing the
crops)...[t]he taxpayer is treated as providing the farmland for use
in a farming activity conducted by a joint venture in the
taxpayer's capacity as an owner of an interest in the joint
venture.  Accordingly...the taxpayer is not engaged in a rental
activity, without regard to whether the taxpayer performs any
services in the farming activity."36
The regulations make it clear that a crop share or livestock
share lease is a joint venture and not a rental real estate activity,
regardless of the degree of involvement by the taxpayer in the
operation.  In contrast, the instructions to Form 4835, "Farm
Rental Income and Expenses," which is used by non materially
participating landowners as taxpayers, states—
"Use this form only if the activity is a rental activity for
purposes of the passive activity loss limitations....[I[f you
actively participated in the operation of this activity and you
show a loss...you may be able to deduct up to $25,000 of losses
from all rental real estate activities."
The instructions to Form 4835 thus suggest that the deduction
under the active participation test would be available for a non
material participation share lease.  Moreover, we had been advised
in recent months by individuals in the Internal Revenue Service
that the instructions to Form 4835 represented the current IRS
position and that the language in the temporary regulations should
not be viewed as applicable to crop share and livestock share
leases.
The Department of the Treasury has now indicated that
Example 8 of the regulations is the correct interpretation with no
mention made of the conflict between the regulation and the Form
4835 instructions.37  The IRS position seems inconsistent with
well established tax law which has been interpreted as providing
that non-material participation share leases produce rental
income.38
Based on the current IRS position, taxpayers unable to meet
the material participation test would be well advised to shift to a
cash rent lease in order to become eligible for the deduction of up
to $25,000 under the active participation test for rental real estate
activities.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ADVERSE POSSESSION
OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION . In 1951,
the plaintiffs purchased a northern portion of land owned by the
seller but the southern boundary marked on the land included ten
acres not included in the legal description of the land sold.  The
remaining southern portion was sold in 1979, and in 1985, the
purchasers of the remaining portion discovered the error and
claimed title to the ten acres.  The plaintiffs brought a quiet title
suit alleging title to ten acres of land by adverse possession.  The
trial court ruled that the plaintiff had title by adverse possession.
The court held that sufficient evidence was presented to support
the judgment because the plaintiffs and the seller had staked out
the boundaries of the sold portion and the community had treated
the disputed acres as owned by the plaintiffs.  The court also held
that sufficient evidence was presented of the plaintiff's actual
possession of the ten acres from the plaintiff's use of the land for
a residence, an archery range, trash burning and timber cutting.
Green v. Lange, 797 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. App. 1990).
BANKS
FIDUCIARY DUTY .  The plaintiffs had obtained farm
operating loans from the defendant bank for several years, but in
1985, the defendant refused to advance loans for the crop year and
suggested that the plaintiffs obtain a loan from the FmHA.
Although the plaintiffs, apparently, obtained a loan from the
FmHA, the plaintiffs sued the defendant for breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, breach of implied-in-fact contract and interference with
the FmHA loan contract.  The court held that the defendant had no
fiduciary duty toward the plaintiffs resulting from the past loans
where the defendant did not assent to or become aware of any
fiduciary relationship.  The court also dismissed the plaintiff's
fraud allegations because the allegations were based upon a breach
of the fiduciary duty (which was already rejected) to inform the
plaintiffs about various aspects of the FmHA loan.  The court
held that no contract-in-law for the defendant to lend the plaintiff
operating expenses was created because both parties did not agree
to any such contract and the past loans did not create any contract
right to future loans.  Irons v. Community State Bank,
461 N.W.2d 849 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AUTOMATIC STAY .  At the time of filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor was current on all local property taxes;
however, after the filing, the taxes became delinquent and the city
and county argued that the statutory liens which attached were
entitled to super priority over other security interests in the
debtor's land for which the taxes were owed.  The court held that
the statutory liens were void as violating the automatic stay
because the liens did not arise until the taxes were assessed, which
occurred post-petition.  Makoroff v. City of Lockport,
916 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'g 111 B.R. 1 0 7
(W.D. Pa. 1990), aff'g 95 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W . D .
Pa. 1989).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  The debtors executed con-
tracts for future delivery of grain to a creditor in return for the
ability to purchase seed, fertilizer and chemicals for production of
the grain during the crop year.  After harvest, the debtor delivered
the grain to the creditor who offset the amount owed by the debtor
with the proceeds of the sale of the grain.  The debtor declared
bankruptcy a month after the offset and the trustee sought to avoid
the offset as a preferential transfer.  The court held that the date of
transfer was not the date of the execution of the contracts but the
date of the application of the grain proceeds to the debtors'
account.  The court also held that the contracts did not give the
creditor any right in the grain but served only to set the price for
the grain as between the debtor and the creditor and that the parties
did not agree to the offset as the purpose of the contract.  The
court also rejected the creditor's claim that the contract and offset
was a payment in the ordinary course of business because the
creditor had not required the contract in previous purchases of
supplies by the debtor.  Thus, the court held that the offset was a
preferential transfer.  In re  Woker, 120 B.R. 454 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1990).
CLAIMS.  In the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, the secured por-
tion of a creditor's claim secured by a pickup was determined
using the wholesale value of the truck.  The court agreed with the
use of the wholesale value of the truck because the creditor was in
the business of financing automobile dealers and not in the
business of buying and selling vehicles.  In re  Owens, 1 2 0
B.R. 487 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990).
DISCHARGE.  The debtors originally filed their case under
Chapter 7 but later converted the case to Chapter 11.  The creditor
filed a complaint against discharge of a claim 56 days after the
case was converted but more than 60 days after the first meeting
of creditors in the Chapter 7 case.  The creditor argued that Bankr.
Rule 1019(3) allowed the creditor an additional 60 day period after
the conversion of the case.  The court held that Rule 1019 does
not refer to conversions of Chapter 7 cases to Chapter 11 and that
none of the reasons for the extension of time in those situations
